










































François Mitterrand and the Grey Zone of Vichy
Citation for published version:
McDonnell, H 2019, 'François Mitterrand and the Grey Zone of Vichy', French Politics, Culture & Society,
vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 87-109. https://doi.org/10.3167/fpcs.2019.370204
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3167/fpcs.2019.370204
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Published In:
French Politics, Culture & Society
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2020
1 
 
François Mitterrand and the Emergent Grey Zone of Vichy France 
Dr Hugh McDonnell, Politics and International Relations, University of Edinburgh 
3.22, 3rd Floor, Flat 1, 
18 Buccleuch Place, 
Edinburgh, EH8 9LN. 
United Kingdom.  
Hugh.McDonnell@ed.ac.uk  
(+44) 131 515697 
Biographical Data 
Hugh McDonnell is a Postdoctoral Fellow on the European Research Council Starting Grant 
project entitled: Illuminating the “Grey Zone”: Addressing Complex Complicity in Human 
Rights Violations - http://blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk/greyzone/. He completed his PhD at the University 
of Amsterdam where he worked between the department of European Studies and the 
Amsterdam School of Cultural Analysis. His work Europeanising Spaces in Paris, c. 1947-
1962 (Liverpool University Press, 2016) examines ways in which ideas about Europe and 





Bourdieu, complicity, exculpation, grey zone, Mitterrand, political field 
 
Abstract 
This article re-examines the 1994-1995 controversy surrounding President Mitterrand’s past 
involvement with Vichy France through the concept of “the grey zone”. Differing from Primo 
Levi’s grey zone, the concept here refers to the language which has emerged in France to 
2 
 
capture the hitherto neglected complex complicity of bystanders, beneficiaries, ideological 
acquiescence, or indirect facilitation of injustice. Re-examining the Mitterrand-Vichy affair is 
a useful illustration of the nuances and different modes of usage of this idiom of the grey zone, 
both for indictment and defense. Conversely, paying attention to this discourse of the grey zone 
allows us to understand the logic and stakes of both the criticisms of Mitterrand and his 
responses to them, particularly in terms of upholding and transgressing boundaries of 
republicanism. These competing claims are examined using Bourdieu’s concept of political 




“I work in shades of grey,” President Mitterrand remarked in 1995. “There are black threads 
and white threads. I weave them together and with that I make grey.”1  Such was his approach 
as he neared the end of his second term in office, and indeed of his life, and was forced to 
account for his Second World War experience in controversial circumstances. This past was 
thrust back into the spotlight with the publication of Une jeunesse française: François 
Mitterrand, 1934-1947 by Pierre Péan. As Le Monde recently recollected, “curieusement, tous 
deux sous-estiment le choc que va causer le voile levé sur les dernières zones grises de son 
itinéraire.”2 Overshadowing his later Resistance record, the subsequent furor in the media drew 
public attention to the ambiguity of Mitterrand’s prior role during the War in the grey zone of 
Vichy positions and connections, his pre-war flirtations with the far right, his post-war relations 
with figures tainted by Vichy, and his less than convincing explanations for a seemingly shady 
past that extended into his Presidency.  
This grey zone is not Primo Levi’s.3 Instead, it refers to the language of greyness 
stressed by historians like Henry Rousso and Olivier Wieviorka, which emerged in France over 
the last decades to capture the positions of people who were located between the previous 
“master narrative” categories of heroes and victims. 4  Rather than legal culpability, this 
concerns the complex complicity of bystanders, beneficiaries, ideological acquiescence, or 
those who made abuses possible without necessarily acting as co-principal wrongdoers. Yet, 
the nuances of this idiom of greyness, and its modes of application, and implications for French 
politics require greater further investigation and specification. The 1994-1995 Mitterrand affair 
is a particularly illuminating example, demonstrating how this idiom facilitated interrogating 
expanded conceptions of complicity below the level of culpability, but also that the grey zone 
cut both ways; it could be put at the service of exculpation. Conversely, considering the 
Mitterrand controversy in the context of discourse about the grey zone helps us to understand 
its nature and intensity, particularly in terms of the upholding of the borders of republicanism.  
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In drawing out this multifaceted nature of the discourse of the grey zone or its 
equivalents in relation to Mitterrand, the article engages with Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding 
of the nature of political scandal. This offers insight into the logic and stakes of both the charges 
made against Mitterrand, and his responses to them as an outgoing and dying President. 
Bourdieu’s broader theory of the political field and political capital in turn allows us greater 
precision in mapping the terrain that at once curtailed and provided the resources for 
Mitterrand’s counter-arguments. I examine how Mitterrand reacted to these claims by 
mobilizing propitious discursive resources and positioning himself in relation to other political 
actors. This involved, first, pointing to his republican credentials, including the institutional 
authority of the Presidency of the French Republic; second, harnessing dominant modes of 
memory discourse and emphasizing his own Resistance record; and, third, crucially, 
repurposing or diverting the very language of the grey zone to defend himself. 
As we will see, the grey zone can also be invoked in the sense of epistemological and 
moral uncertainty, which are not easily parsed out. Indeed, there are three discernible, albeit 
closely connected, senses of the grey zone that Mitterrand put to work in his defense. These 
were, firstly, an appeal to the grey zone in the sense that nothing was clear at Vichy, so 
intransigent retrospective moral indictments are misplaced or invalid; Vichy was an 
insufficiently clear situation for most people to act with requisite lucidity to meet the threshold 
for any meaningful sense of complicity. Second, that Vichy was not a bloc and was a singularly 
complicated phenomenon, and that current commentators, in their blinkered black and white 
thinking, missed this. They thereby failed to understand or accept that there were all sorts of 
ways that republicanism was upheld and Resistance was in fact being actively undertaken at 
and under Vichy. And third, an invocation of the grey zone in the sense of the depersonification 
of wrong-doing and complicity, the abstraction of which precluded moral indictments being 
convincingly or appropriately applied to individuals.  
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 The article will first review the Mitterrand-Vichy controversy before turning to the 
relevance of Bourdieu’s conceptions of political scandal and the political field. I then examine 
how these concepts mapped on to the historical conjuncture in France at the time of the scandal, 
pointing in particular to the prominence of the language of republicanism, including its neo-
republican inflection, as well as hegemonic ways of thinking about the past in general, and the 
Vichy past in particular. I then analyze how Mitterrand himself played this political field in 
relation to the scandal and his own priorities as an outgoing and dying president. This includes 
his emphasis on his republican credentials, presenting his Resistance record, and, crucially, his 
instrumentalization and repurposing of the very language of the grey zone to exculpate himself.  
 
 
The 1994-1995 Controversy 
 
A key moment in the development of the controversy regarding Mitterrand’s Vichy 
past and present was the 1994 publication of Une jeunesse française: François Mitterrand, 
1934-1947. Although written by the journalist Pierre Péan, Mitterrand participated in its 
execution, receiving Péan for extensive interviews. As his interviewer on France 2, Jean-Pierre 
Elkabbach put it, ‘‘Cette fois, Monsieur le Président, c’est vous qui avez, en quelque sorte, mis 
le feu aux poudres.”5 Much of the story Péan told was already known but, supplemented by 
new material, was brought back into the public eye at a particularly sensitive time, around the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Liberation and of the end of the Second World War. This conjuncture 
and Mitterrand’s profile overdetermined his singling out as a “Vichysto-Résistant”, though he 




While Mitterrand was by and large happy with Péan’s job the story quickly took on a 
life of its own, crystallizing into queries and accusations regarding Mitterrand’s relationship to 
the grey zone of Vichy.7 Taken as whole, four key elements of the scandal can be identified, 
which pointed to Mitterrand’s complicity with Vichy in various ways and varying degrees:  1. 
Mitterrand’s pre-war politics; 2. His time working at Vichy; 3. His post-war association with 
Vichy figures; 4. In his conception of France’s historical responsibility.  
 
1. Mitterrand’s Pre-War Politics 
Longstanding claims that Mitterrand had been in Action française were refuted, as were 
stories that circulated in the 1950s of his direct involvement in a right-wing conspiracy in 1937, 
when the secret network of officers and politicians called Cagoulards plotted to overthrow the 
Republic. 8  However, as a student in Paris in the mid-1930s, Mitterrand mixed in other 
ideological circles that would feed into and celebrate Pétain’s National Revolution at Vichy. 
He joined the Volontaires Nationaux – the youth division of Colonel de la Roque’s Croix de 
Feu, wrote articles for the very conservative L’Echo de Paris, took part in rightist 
demonstrations against les métèques in February 1935 – the racist nature of which Mitterrand 
now claimed not to remember9, and against Gaston Jèze, the Jewish law professor who had 
defended the Negus of Abyssinia against Mussolini at the League of Nations, in March 1936. 
His royalist sympathies took him to visit the Comte de Paris, pretender to the throne, in Belgium 
in 1939. Notwithstanding, these aspects of the President’s biography induced much less 
comment and controversy than his role in the Vichy regime and his relationship to its legacy.  
 
2. Mitterrand at Vichy 
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In his 1969 Ma part de vérité, Mitterrand invoked his mobilization into the French army 
and subsequent capture and then escape from a POW camp in Germany in late 1941: “Rentré 
en France, je devins résistant sans problème déchirant.”10 Then his account skipped from the 
end of 1941 to December 1943 and his meeting as a representative of a Prisoners of War 
resistance group with de Gaulle in Algiers without mention of his presence at Vichy, where he 
had gone in early 1942, shortly after his return to France. In 1994, however, Mitterrand’s 
Resistance story was overshadowed by the emergence of the fuller story of his taking up a 
position as, first, a documentarist of the French Legion of Combatants, from January to April 
1942, and second, as a press officer for the southern zone at the Board of Rehabilitation of 
Prisoners of War and the Repatriated, from May 1942 to January 1943. Mitterrand was 
dismissive of the implications of his first position, in an organization created by Xavier Vallat, 
Vichy’s first commissioner for Jewish Questions, with responsibility for producing and 
disseminating propaganda for the regime, much of it anti-Jewish. 
 
3. Post-War Vichy Associates and Connections 
Perhaps the crux of the Mitterrand controversy in 1994 was not what he had done as a 
young man a lifetime before, but his connections with Vichy, which persisted through to his 
Presidency. Ammunition for that case was provided by Mitterrand’s practice of laying a wreath 
at Petain’s grave annually from 1986 until 1992. He insisted this was a tradition that previous 
French presidents had observed to honor the Pétain of Verdun, but to eschew being a source of 
division for the French people he had discontinued the practice. Nonetheless, the inclusion on 
the front cover of the Péan book of the young Mitterrand meeting Pétain at Vichy inevitably 
reopened this wound, as did the publicity for Mitterrand’s 1943 Francisque award for service 
to the Maréchal, and extracts of youthful writings expressing enthusiasm for his leadership.11 
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In terms of Mitterrand’s direct, personal connection to Vichy figures, the most 
controversial was René Bousquet – secretary-general of the Vichy police from April 1942 to 
December 1943, and a central figure in the organization of the infamous Vel d’Hiv round-up 
of Parisian Jews in July 1942. Mitterrand himself stoked this controversy by adding to 
suspicions that he had protected Bousquet from prosecution during his presidency when he 
repeatedly inveighed on the admirable qualities of his old associate.12 In his live interview on 
France 2 on 12 September 1994, for instance, Mitterrand was unyielding and highly defensive 
about his connection to Bousquet, who, he later insisted to Elie Wiesel, was “intelligent, even 
brilliant [and] physically courageous.”13 
 
Bourdieu on Political Scandal and the Political Field 
 
 A useful framework through which to make sense of the explosiveness of the 
controversy and the doggedness of Mitterrand’s response is Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding 
of political scandal. In turn this connects to his conception of the political field, which refers 
to the area of struggle to maintain or challenge positions of power by employing political 
capital. 14   Rather than necessarily cynical calculation, political practice is driven by pre-
reflective dispositions of those who have attained a specific competence, learned through 
experience, of how to behave politically in an effective manner. The players also have the 
requisite – yet differential – political capital to participate in the game of politics. Politics is “a 
game in which the stakes are the legitimate imposition of the principles of vision and division 
of the social world.” This involves the doxa of a social order – a “pre-reflexive agreement”, or 
“primordial political belief”, which are rooted in the incorporation of the dominant vision of 
order in the dispositions of individuals’ habitus.15 One of the effects of a political field is the 
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delimitation of possible ideas from which ordinary citizens can choose. Several key features of 
Bourdieu’s political field bear further explication since they are especially pertinent to the 
analysis of Mitterrand here.  
1.  Symbolic Capital as Political Capital 
Bourdieu veered between two understandings of political capital, one of which is that 
which is homologous to his conception of symbolic power, which he described as “the social 
authority to impose symbolic meanings and classifications as legitimate”.16 He continued: 
“individuals and groups can accumulate through public recognition of their capital holdings 
and positions occupied in social hierarchies. Symbolic capital is a form of credit and it takes 
symbolic capital accumulated from previous struggles to exercise symbolic power.”17 Political 
capital of this kind refers to a “particular kind of symbolic capital”, “a reputational capital 
linked to notoriety” that is “linked to the manner of being perceived”. 18  He noted that 
maintaining and increasing political capital involves much political labor to secure the trust, or 
credit, and avoiding the discredit of the supporting group.19 Indeed, he argued that the political 
field operates according to a logic of credit and credence: “Political capital is a form of 
symbolic capital, credit founded on credence or belief and recognition or, more precisely, on 
the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or on an object) the 
very powers that they recognize in him (or it).”20  
Political scandal, then, comes to a head with the violation or transgression of collective 
interests in favor of personal self-interest. 21  Whereas in other fields failure to fulfil 
expectations or promises might be perceived as a mistake, in the political field it is far more 
liable to be conceived of as betrayal. It is because this specific capital is 
a pure fiduciary value which depends on representation, opinion, belief, fides, that the man of 
politics, like the man of honour, is especially vulnerable to suspicions, malicious 
misrepresentations and scandal, in short, to everything that threatens belief and trust, by 
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bringing to light the hidden and secret acts and remarks of the present or the past which can 
undermine present acts and remarks and discredit their author.22  
This involves “unceasing work both to accumulate credit and avoid discredit.”23  This form of 
capital is “supremely free-flowing” – its investment and divestment is distinctly unrestrained.  
Bourdieu further claimed that there are different modes of holding authority, or, 
distinctive avenues into power. He invokes the example of de Gaulle to illustrate alternative 
ways of attaining political capital. Rather than the slow and continuous accumulation of capital 
typical of the notable, the likes of de Gaulle accrue capital from a heroic or prophetic inaugural 
action “performed in a crisis situation, in the vacuum and silence left by institutions and 
apparatuses”. 24   Mitterrand’s long-standing rivalry with de Gaulle maps closely onto 
Bourdieu’s distinction here, with implications, as we will see, for Mitterrand’s interventions in 
1994-1995.  
There is also a marked future-orientation to political strategizing in Bourdieu’s account, 
in which “political propositions, programmes, promises, predictions or prognostications” 
figure centrally.25 Yet, Mitterrand was something of an anomaly as an incumbent President 
who was nearing the end of his life at an advanced age and suffering from cancer. His 
interventions were much less about future political campaigning – even in terms of his legacy 
to the Parti socialiste – than wanting to take stock of his life and career. Indeed, Philip Short 
notes that, “Mitterrand’s principal goal in the months that remained was to burnish the image 
he would leave behind.”26  
To work through the metaphor of (vulnerable) credit in the politician as a carrier of 
words and ideas, the Mitterrand-Vichy controversy arose at a time when, with his impending 
exit from the political field, the President’s priority was to cash out his political capital and 
bequeath it to his legacy, in the sense of historical reputation. This was disrupted, however, by 
a dispute regarding the nature and sum of his historical balance and debt or liabilities to be 
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detracted in light of, among other perceived shortcomings, the Vichy revelations. Given the 
time remaining to him, Mitterrand had no recourse to the typical ex-presidential practice of 
writing a memoir, and thus had no unmediated, univocal accounting of his balance. Short notes 
how Mitterrand used his interviews in this period as a proxy for this, although he was 
dissatisfied with the results.27 
 
2. Social Capital as Political Capital 
 The other sense of political capital in Bourdieu’s work is more akin to his concept of 
social capital – rather than reputation, this is about the authority accruing from delegation to 
political office or within political institutions, often involving the power of official consecration. 
It also pertains to holding resources such as parties, prominent occupations or positions in the 
media. At stake here was not Mitterrand’s claims per se, but the authority with which they were 
backed. As Bourdieu argued, “what creates the power of words and slogans, a power capable 
of maintaining or subverting the social order, is the belief in the legitimacy of words and of 
those who utter them. And words alone cannot create this belief.”28 This is relevant to the 
auditing of Mitterrand’s symbolic political capital in the context of the duties and expectations 
of the French presidency on the one hand, and the deference he commanded through that 
institution, on the other; likewise, the clout of countervailing critical media outlets, notably Le 
Monde under the new leadership of Jean-Marie Colombani and Edwy Plenel.29  
 
3. Relational Nature of Political Practice 
Bourdieu stresses the inherently relational nature of practice. Any political actor takes 
into account the position of other actors. Political action, stances, and programs are understood 
in terms of oppositions and affinities between the various participants within the political field. 
Taking a political position follows a relational logic in which each act is defined “in and 
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through difference” in terms of the universe of competing positions within the political field.  
As Bourdieu put it, “the field as a whole is defined as a system of deviations on different levels 
and nothing, either in the institutions or in the agents, the acts of the discourses they produce, 
has meaning except relationally, by virtue of the interplay of oppositions and distinctions.”30 
Furthermore, “in order to understand a political stance, programme, intervention, 
electioneering speech, etc., it is at least as important to know the universe of stances currently 
offered by the field […] adopting a stance, a prise de position, is, as the phrase clearly suggests, 
an act which had meaning only relationally, in and through difference.”31 By extension, there 
are internal and external fields at work here, as, for instance, within a political party and 
between a political party and its competitors. As we will see, the relational aspect of 
Mitterrand’s interventions in 1994-1995 was manifest, particularly with regard to the Parti 
socialiste and in terms of the inevitable comparisons drawn with de Gaulle.  
 
The French Political Field and the Mitterrand-Vichy Affair 
 
 What, then, were the key features of the political field and political doxa curtailing, 
shaping and providing the discursive resources for Mitterrand’s reaction and interventions? 
One can schematically divide these up into the languages of Republicanism and of memory 
discourse. The first encompassed national unity and consensus, and expectations of the office 
of the Presidency of the Republic, particularly in terms of guaranteeing and promoting national 
unity. The second pertains to the way Mitterrand defended himself by mobilizing his 
Resistance credentials, and his positioning within current trends in historiography and modes 
of remembrance and commemoration.   
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 First, a key political coordinate in situating Mitterrand’s defense was the political 
language of republicanism, including its neo-republican inflection precisely at this moment in 
the mid-1990s. As Emile Chabal shows, this trend of thought originated in declining economic 
fortunes from the early 1970s with the fading of the trente glorieuses; growing friction over 
“immigration”; and the fading of the grand ideologies that had governed post-war French 
politics – Gaullism, socialism and Communism – as France’s self-proclaimed crisis showed no 
signs of reversal or resolution.32 Chabal argues that it was at this point that some public figures 
renovated the language of republicanism – “not as a historical passion confined to the pages of 
history books, but as a living political ideal that could offer real solutions to intractable socio-
economic and political problems. By the 1990s, republicanism and the Republic had become 
unavoidable reference points in French political discourse.”33 The muscular national narrative 
typical of neo-republicanism put distinct stress on national unity and citizenship based on 
consensus (sometimes manifested through an idealization of the Third Republic).  
Chabal also argues that it is not by chance that this revival of interest in republicanism 
coincided with the longest period of left-wing rule in French history with Mitterrand’s 
presidency. 34   Not that he characterizes Mitterrand himself – who was, after all, formed 
politically in an earlier generation – as a neo-republican. Rather, there was something of a 
convergence, even mutual bolstering, of Mitterrand’s political trajectory and this intellectual 
trend as he shed his more radical promises, first with the famous 1982-1983 U-turn on 
Keynesianism, his marginalization and deposition of his erstwhile allies in the PCF, and the 
general turning away from the language of class struggle to that of national unity and consensus. 
The latter was given additional impetus in the pivotal year of 1989 with the bicentenary 
celebrations of the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall.35 
 Having invested so heavily in the legitimating language of republicanism, Mitterrand 
naturally saw it as a guarantee against the Vichy claims. Conversely, they were by the same 
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token particularly damaging for Mitterrand, given the common sense understanding of the 
Vichy regime as the rejection of the heritage of 1789 and the very antithesis of the Republic.36 
This tension permeated Mitterrand’s varying instrumentalizations of the language of the grey 
zone. 
As if to belie, or perhaps symptomatic of, such a stress on consensus and unity in the 
republican idiom, various antagonisms characterized the French political scene, and indeed 
were presented to Mitterrand side by side with the Vichy scandal as topics in his interviews. 
One of the most important stakes of Mitterrand’s entanglement in the grey zone of Vichy was 
its implications for his attendant discourse about France, the nation and the Republic. This 
connection was forged by the inclusion in Mitterrand’s interviews of questions about 
contemporary politics as well as the Vichy issue so that there was, to a certain degree, a sense 
of juxtaposition. Issues included notably the banlieues – shorthand for immigration and 
integration worries and persistent and steep unemployment.  
 The suggestion here is not simply that Mitterrand faced additional political pressures 
and challenges which were added to the weight on his shoulders with the eruption of the Vichy 
revelations. And clearly there is no sense in which these forms of exclusion were 
commensurable with Vichy’s racial persecution. But nonetheless his insistence on radical 
dichotomy between a French Republic premised constitutively on inclusion, and a Vichy 
regime of exclusion – with which, as a stalwart of the former, he parried accusations of 
complicity with the latter – was additionally strained by the persistence of conspicuous 
antagonisms in contemporary France.   
Relatedly, the auditing of Mitterrand’s political capital involved a contestation over the 
duties and expectations of a president, and conversely, the deference he could command. In 
Mitterrand’s interviews, this dynamic of competing claims, condemning or exculpating his 
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Vichy past, was certainly apparent. On the one hand, there was an express request for 
Mitterrand to give an account of his Vichy past and connections in view of his role as President. 
As the journalist Jean-Pierre Elkabbach put it to the president at the start of the France 2 
interview on 12 September 1994 with reference to the Vichy revelations: “Les Français veulent 
donc comprendre, et comprendre d’autant plus qu’il s’agit du Président de la République, c’est-
à-dire du garant de l’unité de la Nation, du garant de la mémoire de la Nation.”37 Likewise, 
Duhamel pointed out the institutional pitfall of any attempt to present a personal narrative: 
“Once a Head of State talks of his past, what he says becomes not only a personal historical 
account but also a political message. The historical importance of Mitterrand also explains the 
scale of the controversy. In France the Head of State is the nation.”38 All the more so given the 
personalization inherent to the presidential system of the French Fifth Republic, an aspect of 
the national political life exacerbated by Mitterrand’s famed monarchical demeanor and style.39 
But by the same token, the French presidency exacts distinct deference, as noted by historians 
of France like Judt and Stanley Hoffmann. This remained the case even taking into account a 
certain licentiousness on the part of the press during this affair, not having to fear reprisals from 
the Elysée, where a fading and outgoing President resided in late 1994. That Wiesel was a 
personal friend explains why this was not so evident in their interviews, and it is no coincidence 
that it was he who pressed Mitterrand the most, especially on his association with Bousquet.40 
Secondly, Mitterrand’s positioning had to engage with the doxa of memory, both in 
regard to Vichy specifically, and memory discourse in general. Regarding the former, 
Mitterrand staked out his position by leveraging the authority granted in common sense 
thinking to Resistance veterans, necessarily reinforcing the de Gaulle comparison. Doing so, 
however, needed to be calibrated with shifting trends in memory discourse and historiography, 
which were a significant backdrop to the Mitterrand revelations. Debt to the past arose as a 
question on the occasion of landmark anniversaries from 1989 to 1995, including occupation 
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and liberation, as well as events like the 1942 Vel d’Hiv round-up. If handled adeptly, these 
commemorations were conducive to the accumulation of political capital.41 The acceleration 
in the proliferation of discourse about these events can be gleaned by Mitterrand’s bemusement 
and even irritation that: “On n’a jamais mis autant en accusation Vichy qu’au cours de ces deux 
ou trois dernières années. Moi qui ai vécu toute la période Vichy, la période de la Résistance, 
la période qui nous mène de 1945 à 1990, on n’a jamais autant entendu parler de Vichy que 
récemment.”42  
The historiographical consensus was also an aspect of the ideological terrain Mitterrand 
had to negotiate in his response to concerns about his complicity. As Robert Paxton put it at 
the time,  
[Mitterrand] is wagering his historic reputation that most of the French public rejects the hard, 
judgmental contours of the current scholarly consensus in favor of his fuzzier, kinder Vichy: 
the Vichy of grandpapa, businessman or fonctionnaire or syndic communal of the Peasant 
Corporation, good people doing their best in a difficult time, sharing space in the Vichy 
pétaudière with more dubious types but really resisters at heart, engaged in a double jeu, 
innocent of the crimes forced upon Vichy by the Nazi occupation.43  
In short, a greyed Vichy. Hoffmann notes certain tendencies in the mainstream of 
historiographical debate which are prone to support such positions, notably René Rémond’s 
emphasis on the internal heterogeneity and complexities of Vichy. 44  Mitterrand in fact 
referenced Rémond, as well as Eric Conan and Henry Rousso’s 1994 Vichy: un passé qui ne 
passe pas, to support his own position.45  
Crucially, a fundamental touchstone for thinking about Vichy by the 1990s was the 
notion of the grey zone or its equivalents in explicit or implicit understandings of nuanced 
degrees between guilt and innocence, involving being complicit, a beneficiary, or a bystander. 
This emerged in relation to the crimes and injustices of the Vichy years roughly from the late 
1960s and early 1970s. As Henry Rousso puts it, “instead of a (false) version in black and white, 
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there now prevailed a picture in uniformly dirty grays.”46  If hitherto clearly delineated villains 
could be quarantined, thinking about complicity in the Vichy years began to beg the question 
of quotidian life. Rousso would object that this could manifest in an unattractive censoriousness 
of younger generations open to simplistic or sensationalist “revelations” and to be being 
scandalized. But it equally meant an increased openness to the notion that delineating the 
French generally from the injustices of the Vichy regime was not so simple. And as Mitterrand 
staked out his position about his Vichy past, a related shift in the idiom of memory was that 
from an antagonistic to a cosmopolitan mode of remembering. Moral categories of good and 
evil are operable in both, but in the first mode apply to particularistic tales of “victims” and 
“perpetrators”, whereas the second prioritizes a de-historicized and abstract opposition 
between good and evil.47 One of the senses in which Mitterrand instrumentalized the grey zone 
to defend himself closely paralleled this reasoning. 
  
The Grey Zone and Mitterrand’s Playing of the French Political Field 
 Mitterrand responded to the accusations and aspersions against him in a series of 
interviews from the Autumn 1994 into 1995: with Le Figaro, published on 8 September 1994,48 
the interview broadcast on television on France 2 on 12 September,49 and a series of interviews 
published in 1995 in book form with Elie Wiesel and the young journalist Georges-Marc 
Benamou respectively.50 Mitterrand”s public line can also be reconstructed from historian 
Ronald Tiersky’s presentation of notes provided to him by the President’s staff, detailing 
instructions on how to deal with questions about Mitterrand’s wartime record (hereafter 






 A prominent aspect of Mitterrand’s approach during this episode was to insist on his 
impeccable republican credentials. Rather than a new departure, this was more a ramping up 
of his ongoing investment in the legitimating language of Republicanism, including the claim 
that there was an unbridgeable divide between the Republic and Vichy. Both in his 14 July 
1992 interview and 12 September 1994 on France 2, Mitterrand insisted that the Republic, and 
even France, had no responsibility for atrocities like the Vel d’Hiv round-up. If in one way this 
French Republican triumphalism befitted the historical moment, in another it appeared a white-
washing, and conspicuously offended figures like Jean Kahn, the president of CRIF. 52 
Furthermore, Mitterrand’s stance suggested that French complicity with such crimes could be 
wholly detached from the post-war French state despite the unspoken but intuited continuity of 
administrative, police, civil service and official personnel in Vichy France and the post-war 
Republics.53 
However, Mitterrand also invoked the grey zone of Vichy, suggesting that it was a 
“pétaudière” where the division between Republicans and Vichyites was not so clear after all. 
Andrieu neatly explicates the implications for what was an affront to the doxa regarding the 
memory of complicity with Vichy: 
as he did not engage in self-criticism and as he minimized Vichy’s responsibilities by presenting 
this antirepublican regime as a “bedlam,” “une pétaudière,” he seemed to promote a new 
historical legitimacy for France. He erased the legitimacy founded on the symbol of the appeal 
of June 18, 1940, and on the idea of the perpetuation of France-as-Republic through the 
Resistance. At the same time, he seemed to refound France on a Vichyist-republican mix. For 
those who thought that Vichy and the Republic were mutually exclusive, Mitterrand’s interview 
looked like a symbolic coup.54  
 
This is indicative of the important and under-examined aspect of the Mitterrand-Vichy 
affair: the clamor it gave rise to needs to be situated in this kind of boundary transgression, all 
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the more flagrant since Mitterrand insisted so resolutely on that division. To adapt Ann Stoler’s 
argument in the case of colonial history, the grey zone he assumed and invoked equated to a 
kind of boundary zone, which tends to draw inordinate attention for its offending or disrupting 
a sense of social order.55 This was a transgression of a doxa underpinned by the ideological 
currents of neo-republicanism and a certain kind of centrist liberalism, whose prescriptions for 
a muscular national narrative were in the ascendency, in spite of, or because of, various 
prominent fractures in Mitterrand’s France. Mitterrand’s intentions were here somewhat 
contradictory, as our examination of his varying invocations of the grey zone will indicate. 
 Evoking Bourdieu’s conception of political capital in the sense analogous to social 
capital, Mitterrand instrumentalized the institution of the presidency of the Republic. As 
important as the concept of the official story, then, is the officialization of the story, including 
those parts of the story which invoked his three uses of the grey zone to exculpate himself.56 
Perhaps depending on an older doxa of the authority of political office, Mitterrand, in this sense, 
performed the official story, making visible the hierarchy between himself and interviewers. 
Hence the significance of the presidential pomp on display in the France 2 TV interview – the 
statesman-like classic interior of the Elysée, Mitterrand sat at his presidential desk with French 
tricolor, or the significance-saturated date of 14 July for the annual press interview. This was 
the kind of political performance that Bourdieu described as political representatives 
representing themselves as good representatives.  
By the same token, it is striking that Mitterrand refuted criticism of his association with 
Bousquet by appealing to the official nature of the clearing of Bousquet in his 1949 trial in the 
High Court of the Fourth Republic, as well as the esteem in which he was held by political 
notables with impeccable republican credentials. The peremptoriness of officialdom here set 




What of the duties, roles and responsibilities of the President, identified by Elkabbach 
as the repository of the unity and the memory of the nation? As we have seen, Mitterrand 
emphasized that what might have appeared like grey zone complicity by association with 
figures like Bousquet, or at least in neglecting to bring the full weight of the Presidential office 
behind bringing them to justice, was in fact a commitment to reconciliation and national unity. 
To return to Bourdieu on political scandal, Mitterrand here reasserted his commitment to the 
collective good and rebutted notions of personal corruption whether careerist or ideological. In 
the France 2 interview he intimated that, “Moi, depuis de longues années, j'estime que je dois 
tenter d’apaiser les éternelles guerres civiles entre Français.”58 In response to Wiesel’s line of 
questioning about Bousquet, Mitterrand asserted, “Mais comprenez ces choses. La France est 
un pays d’une diversité déconcertante. Ma mission, en tant que Président de la République, est 
de rassembler et de réunir les éléments d’un pays qui, sans un effort constant, tendraient à 
demeurer épars; c’est d’exprimer at d’assurer l’unité de ce pays, d’en garantir 
l’indivisibilité.”59 
 
 Mitterrand, Vichy and his Resistance Credentials  
 
 In a 1993 interview with the historian Olivier Wieviorka, Mitterrand repeatedly 
demurred in response to the question as to whether his Resistance record conferred legitimacy 
and authority on him as President.60 A year later, however, Mitterrand made ample recourse to 
the authority of his Resistance credentials – putting into circulation this political capital, as it 




 In the first instance, Mitterrand insisted that he had nothing to hide, and categorically 
rebuked the notion that his account was a confession, or a rehabilitation of Vichy.61 He stressed 
that his captivity in Germany was the decisive turning point away from the baggage of his 
conservative, petit bourgeois upbringing, quickly culminating in his exalted Resistance 
record.62 In addition, the Elysée staff notes emphasized that his time at Vichy was brief and in 
an innocuous administrative capacity, in contrast to the length and riskiness of his Resistance 
service. Such a move was dangerous and not made by many. As such, rather than Vichy being 
trivialized by Mitterrand, as his detractors had it, it was the latter who were trivializing 
Mitterrand’s rare commitment and brave contribution.63  
 The specter of de Gaulle inexorably loomed over talk of Resistance authority. 
Mitterrand had voiced to Wieviorka his disapproval of the credit that de Gaulle yielded in post-
war France from his resistance credentials, as a resister of the first hour, the myth of the man 
of 18 June 1940. He commented further that it was inevitable that they be compared, as two 
longstanding presidents of the Fifth Republic.64 But, now in 1994, Mitterrand risked coming 
off much the worse in this inevitable juxtaposition.  
Bourdieu’s distinction between the political capital of the notable, slowly accumulated 
over time, and that of the charismatic leader who emerges in crisis akin to de Gaulle, 
corresponds to Wieviorka’s observation that the Vichy affair jarred with Mitterrand’s 
painstaking work to build up his reputation since the Liberation.65 Hence Mitterrand needed to 
minimize the distinction between himself and de Gaulle if his use of his Resistance credentials 
to parry the Vichy allegations was to hold water. And hence the urgency of the claim that the 
Gaullist myth held out a black and white representation of the Resistance that was discordant 
with the historical reality. The Resistance records of the likes of Mitterrand were no less worthy 
of validation – what counted was where he ended up, not his origins at Vichy, however grey 
these might appear. 
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The success of the first aspect of this strategy was perhaps further limited by the trend 
that Rebecca Clifford describes. She argues that precisely in this immediate post-Cold War 
period, as myths of mass resistance faded, the issue of national responsibility for wartime 
crimes began to emerge in public discourse. Flagging up his own resistance record was, 
plausibly, increasingly out of sync with shifting understandings or visions of the Resistance. 
The emerging doxa, in line with the emergence of the cosmopolitan mode of memory, 
privileged not the Resistance fighter motivated by patriotism, but the humanitarian resister 
driven by the protection of human rights.66 Mitterrand’s emphasis on his resistance feats and 
denial that he knew anything about Vichy’s Jewish laws – whether true or false – and his 
mischaracterization of them in hindsight, was arguably dissonant with the common sense of 
this 1994 generation. 
Internally, Mitterrand’s political capital accruing from his Resistance record was 
yielded in his defense against rising dissent within the ranks of the Parti socialiste, already 
divided over the record and direction of the party and increasingly open to the jettisoning of 
the Mitterrand legacy. In the France 2 interview he voiced his concern that, “je ne veux pas 
qu’ils croient que mon passé ou que mon action présente pourraient en quoi que ce soit 
diminuer la valeur de notre combat.”67 Mitterrand was more forceful in asserting himself in 
relation to the party itself, though, and this was plausibly a defining factor in his resolution in 
the France 2 interview to continue until the end, even if there started a campaign to compel him 
to resign. 
He told Benamou that his youthful conservatism and distaste for the Third Republic 
was to be seen in the context of lack of sources of political inspiration – a Stalinised PCF was 
unpalatable, and, “comment aller vers une SFIO molle, divisée, et qui, en 1940, fut pour partie, 
et malgré Blum, complice du meurtre de la République?”68 At a stroke, then, Mitterrand 
reminded the party faithful of his role in resuscitating and renovating the defunct SFIO as the 
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PS, and taking it to power. If the Vichy controversy undermined the party’s carefully 
constructed memorial edifice, Mitterrand reiterated that the PS’s reclaiming of that Resistance 
heritage was his patrimony. As Wieviorka points out, Mitterrand’s investment in his image as 
a Resistance fighter – through initiatives like his 1985 revisit to the Pointe de Beg-an-Fry, from 
where he had embarked for London in 1943 to shore up his Prisoners of War Resistance 
movement – facilitated a socialist reclaiming of the Resistance legacy, which had been 
dispossessed them by the Gaullist and Communist narratives.69  
He was not without important allies in the party, however – luminaries like Jack Lang 
voiced their support for their leader. For Lang, the France 2 interview was a “moving lesson in 
courage, intelligence and truth… (he) gave us all the elements that must now close the debate.” 
On the other hand, he had to shore up his personal and political reputations against prominent 
detractors. Lionel Jospin expressed on TV that, “on voudrait rêver d'un itinéraire peut-être plus 
simple et plus clair, pour l'homme qui fut le leader de la gauche dans les années 70 et 80 […] 
La seule chose que je ne peux vraiment comprendre, c’est les liens qui ont été maintenus, y 
compris dans les années 80, avec un certain nombre de personnages, particulièrement avec 
Bousquet.”70 Dominique Strauss-Kahn worried about the effects of the episode given that anti-
fascism was a bedrock of the French left, while he expressed fear that the Péan book amounted 
to “un commencement de réhabilitation de Vichy”. 71  Damningly, Daniel Cordier – Jean 
Moulin’s former secretary – voiced his sadness that, “le président de la République n’avait 
jamais rompu avec le milieu trouble des années d'occupation, dont la figure symbolique est 
René Bousquet”. Staking out his position explicitly as a resister and citizen, as well as evoking 
Bourdieu’s sense of the specificity of the vulnerability of political capital, he said he had the 
feeling of having been betrayed [trompé].72 
 




Apart from appealing to his own resistance and republican credentials and authority in 
his defense, Mitterrand played the political field by himself conspicuously drawing on, but 
refashioning, the very language of the grey zone. He did so in at least three ways, albeit often 
overlapping. First, Mitterrand repeatedly referred to Vichy as a pétaudière – a shambles of a 
situation, and so a grey zone both morally and epistemologically. Second, a more specific claim 
was that Vichy now tended to be seen in black and white rather than the grey zone it was. Thus 
contemporary commentators all too often failed to see all the ways that republican values were 
upheld and resistance undertaken, even in Vichy itself. And third, his appeal to the shifting of 
judgement from the personal level to the abstract – a grey zone where complicity or wrong-
doing operate according to a logic which is distorted the moment one tries to assign them to 
individuals. Let us unpack each in turn. 
 Mitterrand referred more than once to Vichy as a pétaudière – a shambles or “cauldron 
of confusion”,73 whose chief characteristics were incoherence and lack of transparency. He 
clarified to Benamou what he meant by this, rejecting his suggestion that to describe Vichy as 
such was to banalize it. Pétain, he explained, was an utterly diminished figure, and in his 
capacity as head of state was a thin veneer over far-right figures like Vallat, Alibert or Darquier 
de Pellepoix, who took advantage of this pétaudière to impose their fanaticism on the 
government by operating in the atmosphere of obscurity.74 If Mitterrand had faith in Pétain in 
the early days of Vichy, it was because this lack of transparency prevented him from seeing 
the real situation. This generalized to the country as a whole – on his return to France from a 
German prisoner of war camp, he told Benamou, 
J’ai découvert un pays où régnait, dans tous les domaines, la confusion. Aucune structure ne 
tenait. Rien ne fonctionnait. En zone occupée comme en zone sud, les Français vivaient au jour 
le jour, évitant de parler politique et de se prononcer en faveur de tel ou tel camp. La prudence 
prévalait et, hormis les collaborateurs notoires, il était très difficile de savoir ce que pensait 
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votre interlocuteur. Il n’existait plus d’opinion publique à l’exception de quelques cercles qui 
déjà s’affirmaient dissidents mais restaient sur leurs gardes.75 
 
The connotation of Mitterrand’s claim was that Vichy as a center of government and 
the eponymous regime were quintessentially a grey zone. Morally, people acted under duress 
and in exceptional circumstances, so that intransigent, retrospective moral judgements were 
impossible. As he told Wiesel, “it was an exceptional period, complex and terribly 
dangerous.”76 Epistemologically, his claim referred to both the Vichy period and the present 
day. It was highly problematic to hold individuals accountable, much less to insist on putting 
them on trial, given how difficult it was to know who did what, or to what extent or in what 
way individuals contributed to the systemic crimes and wrongs of the regime. All the more so 
given the lived sense of temporality in which only the here and now counted, and the lack of 
social connections through which to articulate dissent. Mitterrand himself claimed that the 
confusion of the historical conjuncture was disabling as it induced in him a tremendous 
pessimism.77 And if the government was a shambles, it was very difficult to know what was 
going on – nothing was clear enough to be able to make informed judgements about one’s 
comportment. For Mitterrand, complicity has little meaning without a clear sense of what one 
is complicit with – a transparency that this pétaudière precluded. In short, no complicity 
without lucidity. 
In stating his essential agreement with the claim that “it is unjust to judge people on 
mistakes that are to be explained by the atmosphere of the time”,78 Mitterrand contested the 
present-day doxa about complicity with injustice as incommensurable with the singularity of 
this exceptional episode in French history. At times this verged close to affirming the 
republican-Vichy mix that Andrieu identified as a prominent way in which his interventions 
were received, and the transgression of which was key to the clamor around the whole 
controversy. Mitterrand remarked to Wiesel, for instance, that “Vichy was not a bloc, nor was 
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the interior Resistance. Between the two, depending on the time, the borders were sometimes 
porous. The fight against the occupier could take on different forms.”79 
Mitterrand’s second sense of the grey zone was similar to the first claim, but was more 
specific, and, crucially, worked to close down any suggestion of a Vichy-Republic 
interconnection that he had opened up. Fundamentally, this second invocation of the grey zone 
charged many contemporary views on Vichy with being blinkered, black and white in their 
judgements. Failing to grasp the complexity, even contradictoriness of Vichy, they were unable 
to see how republican values were uncompromisingly upheld by many at Vichy, and how 
resistance was undertaken: “most of our contemporaries”, he told Benamou, “are ignorant of 
the history of the war, of the Occupation, and of the Resistance.” Mitterrand was especially 
insistent that this misinformation and myth obscured the reality that ideological contamination 
did not follow from spatial proximity in working at Vichy – “sharing space with in the Vichy 
pétaudière with more dubious types but really resisters at heart”, as Paxton rendered it.80  The 
greyness of Vichy, then, was a superficial one – difficult to penetrate for the uninitiated, but 
beyond which distinct and uncontaminated categories of Republicanism and Vichy 
collaboration held fast. 
Similarly, in connecting to his insistence on his Resistance credentials, Mitterrand was 
vociferous in maintaining that, however much obscured, at Vichy, “il y avait des résistants 
reels. C’était aussi anarchique que ça. C’était une pétaudière.”81 Equally, he derided as “false 
and absurd” the idea that he had belonged to the “Vichy system.”82 In the same vein, he 
dismissed distinctions in rationales of support for Pétain between Pétainists and Maréchalists 
since, “ce sont des subtilités qui m’échappent, qui doivent signifier la même chose. 
Collaborateurs ou pas collaborateurs: ça, c’était clair ! Moi, je sais qu’à l’époque il y avait ceux 
qui marchaient avec l’ennemi et ceux qui marchaient contre lui. Je marchais contre.”83 
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Mitterrand’s third use of the language of the grey zone drew from the changes in 
memory discourse described above in the outline of the contemporary French political field. 
Namely, it involved a shift from thinking about judgement in personal terms, thinking instead 
of wrong-doing and complicity in depersonalized and abstract terms. This view of the flight 
into abstraction through the depersonalization of the experience of Vichy and the Occupation 
precluded moral indictments being convincingly applied to individuals. If this logic did not 
extend to Mitterrand’s guarding his Resistance story in terms of personal heroism, it was all 
the more striking in his defense, or at least fudging account, of Bousquet. Wiesel suggested 
that Mitterrand had painted Bousquet in terms which granted him a humanity he did not deserve, 
that he was evil. Mitterrand replied that, “vous dites qu’il incarne le Mal. Mais le Mal ne 
s’incarne qu’exceptionnellement dans un homme, pas plus que le Bien, d’ailleurs. Les monstres 
sont aussi rares que les saints.”84 Mitterrand had already gestured in this direction in the 1993 
Wieviorka interview, when he denied any kind of equivalence between Paul Touvier – who, 
the following year, would be the first Frenchman convicted of crimes against humanity for his 
role in Vichy – and Bousquet. Whereas he considered Touvier to be a collaborator to the core, 
Bousquet was a “un haut fonctionnaire qui a été pris dans un engrenage.”85 
Here judgment on the personal level was elided into a prioritization of the abstraction 
of complicity. Navigating through the obscurity of this grey zone of history by trying to pin 
down complicity to individuals only led to greater disorientation, both moral and 
epistemological. The further implication was that Mitterrand in turn could himself be attributed 
no connivance with the likes of Bousquet for refusing to turn his fire on him, and complicity 
was shaded into loyalty, just as in his insistence on the complexity of Vichy adding 






Reflecting on Mitterrand’s comment on his propensity to weave grey threads, Philip 
Short concluded that unfortunately, at this time, “France did not want to be reminded of the 
grey in its past.”86 This, however, is a hasty judgement. Stanley Hoffmann argued that the idea 
that French people are averse to looking the past in the face is something of a very outdated 
cliché.  Rather, the problem lies in mastering the past, taming its hotly contested nature. In 
drawing out and exploring the emerging concept of the grey zone in relation to the Mitterrand-
Vichy controversy, this paper has perhaps illuminated one factor behind this – we have seen 
how the grey zone cuts in multiple ways; if it allows one to broaden out the categories and 
individuals who can be interrogated as to their historical responsibilities, it is also a resource 
in claim-making to refute such claims by mobilizing its inherent epistemological and moral 
ambiguity and obscurity. There is a feel of attrition to these claims and counter-claims, 
something akin to a war of position unfavorable to the kind of conclusive or cathartic reckoning 
that would allow one to master the past.  
 We have examined these processes of claim-making and counter-claim-making around 
the specific historic context of Mitterrand’s desire to draw up and cash out with a positive 
balance sheet of his political career, and the requirement to do so within the broader political 
field, understood in Bourdieu’s sense. His three-pronged approach comprised mobilizing his 
Republican credentials, brandishing his Resistance record, and responding to allegations of his 
being in the grey zone of Vichy by instrumentalizing and redirecting the very language of the 
grey zone. This repurposing of this emergent way of thinking about complicity with Vichy in 
turn took three forms: first, by appealing to the grey zone to say that nothing was clear at Vichy, 
so moral indictments, especially fifty years later, were wrong-headed; second, contemporary 
detractors in their blinkered, black and white denunciation of Vichy failed to grasp that within 
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Vichy’s complexity all sorts of resistance was actually being undertaken and Republicanism 
resolutely upheld; and thirdly, an appeal to the grey zone in the sense of paralleling the shift 
away from personification in judgement, to a sort of abstraction of wrongdoing, complicity or 
evil, so as to claim that moral indictments no longer can be fixed to individuals convincingly 
or appropriately. 
Certainly there were conspicuous tensions in his narrative: speaking both personally 
and for the institution of the Presidency; his resort to the capital to be yielded from 
officialization of his narrative in an age of diminishing trust in or indifference to political 
authority; personalization and abstraction of qualities of heroism and goodness on the one hand, 
villainy or evil on the other; and, perhaps most strikingly, between a radical dichotomization 
of Vichy and the Republic and a sort of merging of the two on the other with a kind of 
overlapping grey zone.    
 Ultimately, however, Mitterrand negotiated this historical conjuncture that 
foregrounded the grey zone of Vichy with liabilities largely deferred and his political capital 
not badly depleted. Opinion polls at the time and subsequently held up in his favor.87 Yet, the 
issues raised about the grey zone and Vichy did not recede at all in the controversy’s aftermath. 
One of Jacques Chirac’s first exercises as the new French President was to recognize French 
responsibility in the deportation of Jews to German death camps. The questions that the 
Mitterrand episode gave rise to in terms of the dynamics of political claim-making in relation 
to the grey zone of Vichy, including its attendant questions of relational discourse, claims on 
political capital – particularly in terms of mobilization of officialdom – and the relation of 
accounting for the grey zone of Vichy through the prism of conceptions of France and the 
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